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Classical economic theory contends that the utility of a choice option should be independent of other options. This view is challenged by
the attraction effect, in which the relative preference between two options is altered by the addition of a third, asymmetrically dominated
option. Here, we leveraged the attraction effect in the context of intertemporal choices to test whether both decisions and reward
prediction errors (RPE) in the absence of choice violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives principle. We first demonstrate that
intertemporal decisionmaking is prone to the attraction effect in humans. In an independent group of participants, we then investigated
how this affects the neural and behavioral valuation of outcomes using a novel intertemporal lottery task and fMRI. Participants’
behavioral responses (i.e., satisfaction ratings)weremodulated systematically by the attraction effect and thismodulationwas correlated
across participants with the respective change of the RPE signal in the nucleus accumbens. Furthermore, we show that, because expo-
nential and hyperbolic discountingmodels are unable to account for the attraction effect, recently proposed sequential samplingmodels
might bemore appropriate to describe intertemporal choices. Our findings demonstrate for the first time that the attraction effect modulates
subjectivevaluationevenintheabsenceofchoice.Thefindingsalsochallenge theprospectofusingneuroscientificmethodstomeasureutility in
a context-freemanner and have important implications for theories of reinforcement learning and delay discounting.
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Introduction
The independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) principle is a
fundamental property of the majority of choice theories such as
expected utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947)
and is implied by common choice rules such as Luce’s choice
axioms or the softmax choice rule (Luce, 1959; Sutton and Barto,
1998). It states that the relative preference for two options must
not change when other options are added to the choice set.
However, empirical research provides compelling evidence that
the IIA principle is violated systematically in a wide range of
different choice settings and across species (Tversky, 1972; Heath
and Chatterjee, 1995; Shafir et al., 2002; Trueblood et al., 2013;
Berkowitsch et al., 2014). Perhaps the most compelling example
of the violation of IIA is the attraction effect, in which adding a
third alternative D (for decoy), which is clearly inferior to an
option T (for target), but not to another option C (for competi-
tor), increases the probability of choosing T (Huber et al., 1982).
The attraction effect also violates the regularity principle accord-
ing to which the probability of choosing an option must not
increase when a choice set is increased by another option
(Rieskamp et al., 2006). For example, imagine yourself choosing
between two digital cameras, with option T being an expensive
and high-quality product and option C being a cheap and low-
quality alternative. Upon noticing your indifference, a salesman
draws your attention to a third option D, which is even more
expensive than the first one and of slightly lower quality. Of
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Significance Statement
Many theories of value-based decision making assume that people first assess the attractiveness of each option independently of
each other and then pick the option with the highest subjective value. The attraction effect, however, shows that adding a new
option to a choice set can change the relative value of the existing options,which is a violationof the independenceprinciple.Using
an intertemporal choice framework, we tested whether such violations also occur when the brain encodes the difference between
expected and received rewards (i.e., the reward prediction error). Our results suggest that neither intertemporal choice nor
valuation without choice adhere to the independence principle.
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course, you will not pick this new dominated option D, but its
inferiority to the similar high-quality camera T will make this
dominating option more attractive than the competing low-quality
camera C. As a result, you will buy the expensive camera T.
In the present study, we argue that the abundant evidence
against IIA in preferential choice should have similar implica-
tions for our understanding of how the brain learns from reward
and punishment: The reward prediction error (RPE) reflects the
difference between received and expected rewards and acts as the
central teaching signal in reinforcement learning (Schultz et al.,
1997). We propose the novel hypothesis that, similar to its effect
on preferential choices, the attraction effect influences expecta-
tions about rewards even in the absence of choice, which in turn
leads to a modulation of the RPE. To illustrate this point, let us
return to the camera example and assume that you are not mak-
ing a choice, but that a fortune wheel selects one out of the three
options as your reward. We predict that, even though the subjec-
tive values of options T and C are similar when considering only
the two options, the presence of D in the lottery makes T rela-
tively more attractive than C. This implies that winning option T
should be a more rewarding event than winning option C and
should thus elicit a more positive RPE signal. Importantly, it has
been argued recently that RPE coding is stable across different
behavioral contexts, which allows predicting RPE signals in one
task by deriving the utility of different rewards in another task
(Lak et al., 2014). Here, we challenge this putative context inde-
pendence of the RPE by predicting a susceptibility of the RPE to
the attraction effect.
To determine whether the RPE in brain and behavior violates
the IIA principle, we conducted an fMRI experiment in which
participants played a lottery with options taken from intertem-
poral choice tasks (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). Conveniently,
these options are defined by two attributes (i.e., reward amount
and delay), allowing us to test for the attraction effect. Although
there is some evidence formulti-attribute context effects in inter-
temporal choice (Scholten and Read, 2010), to the best of our
knowledge, the attraction effect has never been demonstrated in
this domain. Accordingly, we first establish that intertemporal
choices are prone to the attraction effect. The results of both the
behavioral and fMRI studies challenge existing theories of inter-
temporal choice, including exponential and hyperbolic discount-
ing models (Samuelson, 1937; Mazur, 1987), and provide novel
evidence for the context dependency of subjective valuation of
rewards in the absence of choice.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-one psychology students (15 females; mean age 
22.0 years, SD  1.9, range  19–26 years; one participant without
indication of age) from theUniversity of Basel took part in the behavioral
experiment (henceforth Study 1). The fMRI experiment (henceforth
Study 2) comprised 30 participants (21 females; 24.8 years,4.2, 19–35
years). One participant of Study 2 did not perform the left-right task (see
below) above chance level and was therefore excluded from any further
analysis. Parts of the dataset from the two-alternative choice task of an-
other participant were lost due to a restart of the computer program
during the task. Fortunately, the participant’s discount factor (see below)
could be computed successfully based on the remaining data and the
participant was therefore included in the analysis. Participants in Study 1
received partial course credit for their participation plus an additional
monetary outcome of a randomly selected choice from one of the inter-
temporal choice tasks (paid to the participants by bank transfers at the
corresponding time point). Participants in Study 2 were paid CHF 50
($48 US) for their participation plus the outcome of a randomly se-
lected choice/lottery outcome from the intertemporal choice task/lotter-
ies. All participants gave written informed consent and the study was
approved by the local ethics committee (Ethikkommission Nordwest
und Zentralschweiz).
Experimental design. Both experiments began with filling out a demo-
graphic questionnaire, followed by a classical two-alternative intertem-
poral choice task (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; McClure et al., 2004) in
which participants chose between a later larger reward (LLR) and a
smaller sooner reward (SSR) in 60 trials (see Fig. 1A, left). These trials
were interspersed with 10 “catch” trials, in which one option dominated
the alternative on both attributes, to test whether participants were able
to detect first-order dominance. The dominating option in these catch
trials was consistently chosen in both experiments (Study 1: 100%, SD
0%; Study 2: 99%;6%). Reward amounts could vary between CHF 1
and 30, delays between 1 and 360 d. Each trial began with a fixation cross
in themiddle of the screen (1.5 s), followed by the presentation of the two
choice options on the left and right side. Amount and delay of an option
were depicted numerically in green and red, respectively. In addition,
vertical/horizontal white bars were filled by green/red in proportion to
amount/delay (e.g., if the delay was 270 d, 270/360  75% of the hori-
zontal bar was red). Participants chose one of the options by pressing the
respective button (left/right arrow keys in Study 1, left/right buttons on
an MR-compatible button box in Study 2). The selected option was
indicated by a white frame encompassing the option and participants
confirmed their choice by pressing a third button (spacebar in Study 1, a
third button on the button box in Study 2) to proceed to the next trial.
Participants could change their selection as long as they did not press this
third button. There was no time limit for choices.
The primary goal of the two-alternative choice task was to find an
individual’s indifference point between LLR and SSR options. For the
initial creation of the two-alternative choice set, we used a hyperbolic
discounting function (Mazur, 1987) as follows:
Vi 
Xi
1    Yi
(1)
where X and Y represent the amount and delay of an option i, respec-
tively, and  is the discount factor, which we set to 0.0083, the median
estimate reported in a large sample study with a comparable pool of
participants (Peters et al., 2012). We selected hyperbolic discounting
instead of exponential discounting because the former usually provides a
better account of human intertemporal choices (Kirby and Herrnstein,
1995; Frederick et al., 2002; Peters et al., 2012). Using this function, we
kept V for LLR and SSR options similar (with some added variability).
However, amounts and delays were adaptively changed every sixth trial if
either LLR or SSR options were chosen in less than two of the last six
trials. Upon completion of this task, Equation 1 was fitted to the choice
data using the softmax choice rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998) to derive
choice probabilities as follows:
PLLR 
esoftmaxVLLR
jesoftmaxVj (2)
where P(LLR) is the probability of choosing LLR, j are all possible op-
tions, and softmax is a (free) sensitivity parameter. Parameters  and
softmax were estimated by minimizing the root mean square deviation
(RMSD) with a grid search (301 steps per parameter; range of  between
0 and 0.15; range ofsoftmax between 0 and 20).We chose RMSDand grid
search to quickly obtain robust estimates of the discount parameter with-
out taking the risk of ending up in local minima. The discount parameter
was then used to create multiple sets of five options: two of these five
options were an LLR and an SSR option with similar V and two further
options were decoys DLLR and DSSR, which were similar to the LLR and
SSR options, respectively, with a slightly lower amount (1–2 CHF less)
and a slightly higher delay (1–29 d more) than the respective LLR/SSR
option. The fifth option was a neutral option N with amount and delay
halfway between LLR and SSR (see Fig. 1C). We repeatedly used a set of
five options to create three choice trials for the three-alternative choice
task that followed in Study 1. All of these three trials included the LLR and
SSR options plus DLLR, DSSR, or N. Thirty sets were created to obtain 90
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trials for the three-alternative choice task. A custom-built algorithm was
used to pseudorandomize trial order to ensure that the same option (and
pairs of options) did not repeat on subsequent trials.
Upon completion of the two-alternative task, participants of Study 1
proceeded with the three-alternative intertemporal choice task (see Fig.
1A, right), whichwas highly similar but included a third option presented
in the lower middle part of the screen and selectable via the down arrow
key (note that the spatial arrangement of op-
tions in both tasks was randomized). Unlike in
Study 1, participants of Study 2 went into the
MR scanner to conduct a novel three-
alternative intertemporal lottery task (see Fig.
1B). In this task, each trial started with an ini-
tial fixation cross shown for 3–9 s before the
three possible rewards of the trial’s lottery were
presented for 6–12 s. To ensure that partici-
pants were attentive, the three possible rewards
were displayed either more on the left or more
on the right and participants had to press the
corresponding button on the MR-compatible
button box (for the 29 participants included in
the analysis, the accuracy in this task was very
high: 98%; SD  2%). A green cross ap-
peared in the middle of the three options after
participants pressed the correct button; a red
cross appeared for incorrect responses. If a re-
sponse was incorrect or not made, participants
were told so and the trial was terminated. After
correct responses, an outcome was randomly
selected and indicated for 3 s by disappearance
of the 2 other options and appearance of a
white frame encompassing the actual outcome.
The task consisted of 144 trials in total. The
creation of lottery sets in Study 2 was similar to
the creation of choice sets in Study 1 (i.e., sets
of five options: LLR, SSR, DLLR, DSSR, and N),
but for Study 2, a set of three possible outcomes
(e.g., LLR, SSR, DLLR) was used in three differ-
ent trials so that each option was the actual
outcome once (e.g., LLR in trial 1, SSR in trial
2, DLLR in trial 3) (note that, similar to Study 1,
trials were pseudorandomized so that direct
repetitions of options were avoided). There-
fore, a set of five options could be used to create
nine trials so that 16 different sets were re-
quired to obtain the 144 trials of the lottery
task. Note that this procedure ensures that the
probability of each option being the actual out-
come of the lottery is exactly 1/3, which was
also instructed to the participants. Participants
further knew that, at the end of the experiment,
one of the trials would be selected randomly
and that they would receive the lottery out-
come from this trial (unless they pressed the
wrong button or missed in the left/right task).
After MR scanning, participants in Study 2
conducted half of the lottery trials again, but
this time, they had to indicate their satisfaction
of receiving the actual lottery reward (and not
the other two possible rewards) at the end of
each trial (see Fig. 1B). We consider these sat-
isfaction ratings to be a “behavioral approxi-
mation” of the RPE because people should be
more satisfiedwith receivingmore reward than
expected and less satisfied with receiving less
reward than expected (Tobler et al., 2006). To
indicate their satisfaction with each reward,
participants used a continuous rating scale
from 0 (“very unsatisfied”) to 10 (“very satis-
fied”) with the left and right arrow keys to
move a green bar along the white scale and the spacebar button to con-
firm their rating. The 72 trials for this task were selected by randomly
picking eight of the 16 five-trial sets that were used to create the 144 trials
for the task inside the MR scanner. We decided to collect the satisfaction
rating data in a separate task for two reasons: (1)we did notwant to induce a
specific form of outcome valuation that might have influenced the neural
Figure 1. Task design.A, All participants startedwith a two-alternative intertemporal choice task (left). Reward amountswere
indicated by numbers and a vertical bar in green; delays were indicated by numbers and a horizontal bar in red. Participants of
Study 1 went on to perform a three-alternative intertemporal choice task (right). B, Participants of Study 2 went on to perform a
three-alternative intertemporal lottery task during fMRI. Upon presentation of the three possible outcomes, they had to indicate
whether options were shown more on the left (as in this example) or more on the right. After a variable delay, the actual out-
come was presented. Satisfaction ratings were only obtained in an additional lottery task after scanning. C, Locations in the
two-attribute (money and delay) space of an example set of five options used in the three-alternative choice and lottery tasks.
Based on the results from the two-alternative choice task, several of these five-option sets were created to test for the attraction
effect. For a single trial, three out of the five options were selected. For example, the framed options (LLR, SSR, and DLLR) make up
a choice set in which, according to the attraction effect, LLR is expected to be chosen.
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RPE signal in accordance with our hypothesis (for the same reason, people
were only informed about the rating task after exiting the scanner) and (2)
we wanted to minimize the duration of the task inside the MR scanner.
Stimuli were created and choice sets were presented usingMATLAB (RRID:
SCR_001622) and its Cogent 2000 toolbox.
Behavioral data analysis.The critical test for the attraction effect in our
three-alternative intertemporal choice task (Study 1) is whether the fre-
quency of choosing LLR over SSR increases in the presence of DLLR and
whether the frequency of choosing SSR over LLR increases in the pres-
ence of DSSR. Stated differently, in the presence of DLLR, the LLR option
is the target (and SSR is the competitor), whereas in the presence of DSSR
the SSR option is target (and LLR is the competitor), and the attraction
effect is present when targets are chosen significantly more often than
competitors. Note that our design provides a very strong test of the
attraction effect because the same option acts as target and competitor on
two different trials (i.e., LLR and SSR appear on both trials, with only the
unattractive decoys changing). Statistically, we used a paired t test and
report effect sizes (Cohen’s d). Similarly, we tested for an attraction-
effectmodulation of satisfactionwith the received outcome (a behavioral
proxy of the RPE) in the three-alternative intertemporal lottery task
(Study 2) by comparing the ratings for targets and competitors, again
using a paired t test. In addition, we ran a multiple linear regression with
satisfaction ratings as the dependent variable and the following predictor
variables: (1) the subjective value of the outcome Voutcome, (2) the RPE
(Voutcome and RPE were estimated based on the hyperbolic discounting
model), (3) a variable coding whether the outcome was a target (1) or
a competitor (	1), (4) a variable coding whether the outcome was a
decoy (1), and (5) a variable coding whether the outcome was an LLR
(1) or an SSR (	1) option. Note that, among these predictor variables,
only Voutcome and RPE are not orthogonal to each other. We checked the
average correlation between these as well as their variance inflation factor
(VIF) to ensure that they can be used in the same regression analysis.
Both measures indicate a low level of colinearity compared with other
studies in the field (cf. Hare et al., 2008): average correlation  0.25;
SD  0.22; VIF(Voutcome)  1.27, 0.73; VIF(RPE)  2.77, 1.40.
The regression analysis was conducted to test whether the attraction
effect can explain variance in the ratings over and above the Voutcome and
RPE information given by the hyperbolic discountingmodel.We chose a
mixed-model approach in which the regression is first run within each
participant and the individual regression coefficients are then subjected
to (“group-level”) one-sample t tests against 0.
Cognitive models I and II (hyperbolic and exponential discounting).We
compared four different cognitivemodels against each other with respect
to howwell their choice predictions in Study 1 could be generalized from
the two-alternative to the three-alternative intertemporal choice task and
from trials comprising a neutral option N to trials comprising a decoy
option (within the three-alternative task). The four models comprised
two traditional discountingmodels (i.e., exponential and hyperbolic dis-
counting), a multi-attribute sequential sampling model (i.e., the leaky
competing accumulator; LCA; Usher and McClelland, 2001, 2004) and
the recently proposed intertemporal choice heuristic (ITCH; Ericson et
al., 2015). The hyperbolic discountingmodel is described by Equations 1
and 2 (see above). For the exponential discounting model, Equation 1 is
replaced by the following value function (e.g., Peters et al., 2012):
Vi  Xi  e
	Yi (3)
where X and Y represent the amount and delay of an option i, respec-
tively, and  is the discount factor. The probability of choosing option i is
given by Equation 2.
Cognitive model III: LCA model. LCA relies on a sequential sampling
process with leakage andmutual inhibition, in which each choice option
i is represented by an accumulator Ai that is updated every time step 
t
based on a comparison of i’s attribute value Mi,k on the currently at-
tended attribute k (here: magnitude or delay) with the other options’
attribute values. More precisely, with n choice options andm attributes,
the n by 1 vector A, representing all accumulators, is updated by the
following:
At1  S  At  1  I  Wt  Et (4)
where S represents an n by n leakage and inhibition matrix with  as
on-diagonal elements and		 (1	 ) as off-diagonal elements ( and
	 model leakage and inhibition, respectively), I represents an n by m
input matrix (see below), and Wt represents an m by 1 attention vector
with one element being 1 (representing the currently attended attribute)
and the other elements being 0 (representing the currently unattended
attributes) at every time point t. The probability that a particular attri-
bute is attended to at t depends on the m 	 1 attention weights 
. Et
represents an n by 1 noise vector with each element being drawn from a
normal distribution with mean 0 and SD . Note that LCA is inspired by
neurophysiological constraints and truncates negative values of A to 0
because of the implausibility of negative firing rates (Usher and McClel-
land, 2001, 2004; but see Bogacz et al., 2006). The inputmatrix I contains
the attribute-wise comparisons with each element according to the
following:
Ii, j  I0  kiVi,kj (5)
where I0 represents a constant input to each accumulator and Vi,k
j
represents the output of a comparison between option i and j on the
attribute k that differs depending on whether i is better or worse than
j on attribute k:
Vi,k
j  Mi,k  Mj,k
, if Mi,k Mj,k (6a)
Vi,k
j    Mj,k  Mi,k
, if Mi,k Mj,k (6b)
where  and  represent parameters for marginal utility and loss aver-
sion, respectively, in the sense of prospect theory’s value function (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992). Note
that the assumption of loss aversion is critical for LCA to explain the
attraction effect because competitors, but not targets, are worse than
decoys on one attribute (Usher and McClelland, 2004; Tsetsos et al.,
2010). As being part of the family of sequential sampling models (Smith
and Ratcliff, 2004; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008), LCA
can predict response times when assuming that a choice is made as soon
as one element of A exceeds a decision threshold. However, because we
were interested in predicting choices but not response times, we assumed
that choices were always made after a fixed time interval tmax based on
which element of A was highest at tmax (Berkowitsch et al., 2014; True-
blood et al., 2014).We set tmax to 100, which we found to be sufficient for
the trial-wise LCA predictions to stabilize.
To the best of our knowledge, LCA has never been applied to inter-
temporal choices. We adjusted the model to this choice context by the
following two adaptations: First, we applied a power transformation to
delays D to account for the nonlinearity in time perception (Wittmann
and Paulus, 2008; Zauberman et al., 2009; Dai and Busemeyer, 2014)
using an exponent  to account for interindividual differences in this
nonlinearity. This was necessary because context effects such as the at-
traction effects are usually investigatedwith attributes that have (approx-
imately) linear utility functions, and LCA as well as multi-alternative
decision field theory (MDFT; Roe et al., 2001) and the multi-attribute
linear ballistic accumulator model (MLBA; Trueblood et al., 2014) are
tailored to such attributes. Second,magnitudes and (transformed) delays
were rescaled to values ranging between 0 and 1, where 0 represents the
worst possible attribute value and 1 the best possible attribute value. In
other words, 1 CHF was rescaled to 0, 30 CHF was rescaled to 1, 1 day
was rescaled to 1, and 360 days was rescaled to 0 (with intermediate
values being rescaled accordingly). Note that rescaling has to be done
after (and not before) applying the power transformation of delays to
preserve the shape of the delay curve induced by. Importantly, rescaling
was usedmerely for technical reasons (i.e., to bring the attribute values in
a range in which LCA had been applied in the past) and differs from
procedures that change choice predictions qualitatively (e.g., divisive
normalization; Louie et al., 2013). The rescaled magnitudes and the
power-transformed and rescaled delays were then entered (as elements
Mi,k) into LCA (see above).
LCA is only one out of various sequential sampling models that have
been shown to account for context effects including the attraction effect.
Alternatives include the abovementionedMDFT andMLBAmodels, the
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associative accumulation model (Bhatia, 2013), and the 2N-ary choice
tree model (Wollschla¨ger and Diederich, 2012). The latter three models
are relatively new and less established than LCA and MDFT. Compared
with LCA, MDFT’s simulations require more within-trial samples to
converge (i.e., a higher tmax value; cf. Tsetsos et al., 2010), which reduces
the efficiency of parameter search. Therefore, we chose LCA to represent
the larger class of sequential sampling models for both conceptual and
practical reasons.
Cognitive model IV: ITCH. The ITCH model is based on direct com-
parisons ofmagnitudesX and delaysY (Ericson et al., 2015).We included
it in our model comparison because it has been argued to account for
within-attribute comparison effects in intertemporal choice that are dif-
ficult to reconcile with traditional discountingmodels and because it is in
principle compatible with violations of IIA. When choosing between an
LLR and an SSR option, the probability of choosing LLR is as follows:
PLLR L01 XLLRXSSR2 
XLLRXSSR
X 
3 YLLR YSSR4 YLLR YSSRY   (7a)
with X 
XLLR  XSSR
2
(7b)
and Y 
YLLR  YSSR
2
(7c)
where XLLR (XSSR) is the amount of money associated with option LLR
(SSR), YLLR (YSSR) is the delay associated with option LLR (SSR), L[x] is
the value of the cumulative logistic distribution at x with mean 0 and
variance 1, and the ’s represent regression coefficients (i.e., free param-
eters). Put simply, the ITCH model predicts intertemporal choices by a
logistic regression of absolute and relative differences in X and Y. To
generalize themodel to a situation, in which a third option (O3) is added
to the choice set, we assumed that choices between three options arise
from a sequence of pairwise comparisons. For example, LLR and SSR are
compared first and LLR is preferred in this pairwise comparison with
probability P(LLRLLR, SSR), which is computed as in Equation 7 above.
Next, LLR is compared with O3 and is preferred in this pairwise compar-
ison with probability P(LLRLLR,O3), which is also given by Equation 7
when replacing the X and Y terms of SSR by those of O3. The probability
of choosing LLR given the described sequence (i.e., sequence 1 LLR vs
SSR, then LLR vs O3) is simply the product of the pairwise comparisons
as follows:
PLLR  sequence 1 PLLR  LLR, SSR PLLR  LLR, O3 (8a)
To compute the overall probability of choosing LLR, three other possible
sequencesmust be taken into account (i.e., sequence 2 LLR vsO3, then
LLR vs SSR; sequence 3A SSR vs O3, then LLR vs SSR; sequence 3B
SSR vs O3, then LLR vs O3). We denote the last two sequences by “3A”
and “3B” because they are essentially the same (first SSR and O3 are
compared, then the winner of this comparison is compared with LLR).
The probability of choosing LLR given sequences 2, 3A, and 3B is as
follows:
PLLR  sequence 2 PLLR  LLR, O3 PLLRLLR, SSR
 PLLRsequence 1 (8b)
PLLR  sequence 3A PSSRSSR, O3 PLLRLLR, SSR (8c)
PLLR  sequence 3B PO3SSR, O3 PLLRLLR, O3 (8d)
We assume that all sequences are equally likely to occur, which means
that the probability of sequence 3A and 3B together is 1/3 because both
begin with a comparison of SSR and O3. Therefore, the overall probabil-
ity of choosing LLR is as follows:
PLLR 
2  PLLR  sequence 1 PLLRsequence 3A
 PLLRsequence 3B
3
(9)
The probabilities of choosing SSR and O3 are computed accordingly.
This generalization of the ITCH model has the advantage of preserv-
ing the original choice process represented by Equation 7 of the
model. However, it is important to note that this is only one of many
possible generalizations.
Modeling procedures.We compared the fourmodels against each other
using two generalization tests (Busemeyer and Wang, 2000; see also
Gluth et al., 2015), for which model parameters are estimated based on
one dataset and then used to predict behavior in a second dataset. More
specifically, we conducted a first generalization test by estimating param-
eters of each model for the dataset of the two-alternative choice task and
then predicting the choices participants made in the three-alternative
choice task. In the second generalization test, the models were fitted on
the basis of trials from the three-alternative choice task that comprised
the neutral option N and generalized to trials from the same task that
comprised a decoy option. The generalization test is similar to cross-
validation, but differs from it by testing the fitted models with a new task
design instead of with a replication sample from the same design, thereby
examining to what extent models can be generalized to a new context
(Busemeyer and Wang, 2000). Importantly, model complexity is taken
into account automatically, because overly complex models will overfit
the training dataset and will therefore perform poorly when being gen-
eralized to the test dataset.
The hyperbolic and exponential discounting models have two free
parameters, the discount rate  and the sensitivity parameter softmax.
Our adapted LCA model can have up to eight free parameters, but we
fixed four of them (  0.94; I0  0.75;   0.88;   2.25) to values
already used and reported in the literature (Usher andMcClelland, 2004;
Tsetsos et al., 2010) to speed up parameter estimation and because these
parameters have little impact on predictions when only two alternatives
are in the choice set. Accordingly, the LCA has four free parameters, the
inhibition parameter 	, the standard deviation  of noise, attention
weight
, and for the power transformation of delays. The ITCHmodel
has five free parameters (i.e.,0,1,2,3, and4). The two discounting
models and ITCH have closed-form solutions and were estimated using
maximum likelihood estimation. Because LCA does not have a closed-
form solution, we approximated maximum likelihood estimation by
simulating every trial 100 times and using the choice frequencies as prob-
abilities (Gluth et al., 2013). To avoid that the log-likelihood of LCA (but
also of other models) goes to	when a single choice is predicted with a
probability of 0, the trialwise predictions of all models were truncated to
a minimum and maximum of 0.01 and 0.99, respectively (Rieskamp,
2008; Gluth et al., 2013). For the training datasets, the models were
compared based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz,
1978) as follows:
BICM  devianceM  lnn qM, (10)
where the deviance of a modelM is two times the negative log-likelihood
of the data givenM, n is the number of trials, and q is the number of free
parameters of themodel. For the test datasets, the deviance itself was used
to compare themodels because the generalization test controls formodel
complexity automatically (see above). In addition to the average BIC and
deviance values, we report the model evidence of the best model within
each participant: Following Raftery (1995), we define themodel evidence
as “weak,” “positive,” “strong,” or “very strong” when the BIC/deviance
difference x between the best and the second-bestmodel is x 2, 2 x
6, 6 x 10, or x 10, respectively. Parameter estimation for allmodels
was realized by combining an initial grid search algorithm (with 25 steps
per parameter) to obtain reasonable starting values, which were then
passed on to a Simplexminimization algorithm (Nelder andMead, 1965)
as implemented in the MATLAB function fminsearchcon to obtain the
final estimates. Parameters were constrained for the discountingmodels:
 between 0.0001 and 1, and softmax between 0.001 and 100; for LCA: 	
between 0 and 1,  between 0.05 and 5.05, 
 between 0.01 and 0.99, and
 between 0.01 and 1.01; for ITCH: all ’s between	12 and 12.
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fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing. Whole-brain fMRI data was
collected on a 3 tesla Siemens MAGNETOM Prisma scanner with a 20-
channel head coil. In 3 consecutive runs, a total of 1191 echoplanar
T2*-weighted images (TR 2200 ms, TE 30 ms, FoV 228 228, flip angle
82°) were acquired using 40 axial slices with a voxel size of 2 2 2mm
plus a 1 mm gap between slices. A z-shim gradient moment of 	1.0
mT/m*ms was used to minimize signal drop in the orbitofrontal cortex
(Deichmann et al., 2003). In addition, fieldmaps (short TE: 4.92ms; long
TE: 7.38 ms) and a high-resolution T1-weighted MPRAGE image (voxel
size 1  1  1 mm) were acquired for each subject to improve spatial
preprocessing.
Preprocessing of fMRI data was performed using SPM8 (RRID:
SCR_007037) and commencedwith slice timing correction to themiddle
slice of each volume, followed by spatial realignment and unwarping to
account for movement artifacts. Realignment and unwarping was sup-
ported by correction for geometric distortions using field maps gener-
ated with the FieldMap toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002). The individual
T1-weighted image was then coregistered to the mean functional image
generated during realignment. The coregistered image was segmented
into graymatter, white matter, and CSF by the “new segment” algorithm
of SPM8 and the obtained tissue-class images were used to generate
individual flow fields and a structural template of all participants by the
DARTEL toolbox (Ashburner, 2007). Flow fields were used for spatial
normalization of functional images to MNI space and to create a struc-
tural group mean image for displaying statistical maps. Functional im-
ages were smoothed by a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm FWHM.
Statistical analysis of fMRI data. To avoid different standardization of
input values for parametricmodulators (PMs, see below), the three scan-
ning sessions were collapsed into a single run per participant. Individual
(first-level) design matrices included an onset vector for presentation of
the three lottery offers (duration 6–12 s), an onset vector for the time
point when the left/right response was made (duration  0 s), and an
onset vector for presentation of the actual lottery outcome (duration
3 s). Each of these onset vectors were accompanied by PMs that modeled
the predicted change of the hemodynamic response as a function of a
variable of interest at the respective time point (Bu¨chel et al., 1998). The
lottery offers vector included a PM for the hyperbolic discounted ex-
pected value (EV) of the current lottery, which is given by the following:
EV (V1 V2 V3)/3, where V1 is the value of option 1 according to
Equation 1. The left/right response vector included twoPMs for response
time andwhether the left (1) or the right (	1) button was pressed. The
outcome vector included four PMs for the hyperbolic discounting esti-
mates of Voutcome and RPE, whether the outcome was a target (1) or a
competitor (	1), and whether the outcome was a decoy (1). Note that
similar to the predictor variables in the behavioral regression analysis, the
correlation between the PMs Voutcome and RPE and the respective VIFs
were comparatively low: avg. correlation  0.19; SD  0.17;
VIF(Voutcome) 1.24,0.35; VIF(RPE) 2.11,0.72 (in an additional
exploratory analysis, we also found that the exclusion of Voutcome does
not have a substantial effect on the results). PMs were z-standardized
before implementation into the design matrix and stepwise orthogonal-
ization was deactivated to test for each PM’s unique contribution to
explain variance in the data (Mumford et al., 2015). In addition, three
nuisance onset vectors were included (if necessary) for invalid trials in
which participants missed the left/right task or responded incorrectly
[one vector for presentation of the lottery, one vector for the button press
(in case of incorrect responses), one vector for presentation of the feed-
back slide]. A high-pass filter of 128 s and correction for temporal auto-
correlation were applied to the data (a custom-built algorithm was used
to adjust filter and autocorrelation to the fact that we collapsed the three
scanning sessions). Individual statistical parametric maps were calcu-
lated based on SPM’s GLM estimation procedure. To test for different
BOLD signal contrasts between targets versus competitors depending on
whether thesewere LLRor SSR outcomes, we ran a secondGLM inwhich
we split the target versus competitor PM into two separate PMs for LLR
and SSRoutcomes. To test whether LLR versus SSR outcomes themselves
explained reward-related brain activation, we ran a thirdGLMbut added
another PM to the outcome vector that coded for LLR (1) versus SSR
(	1) outcomes.
At the group level, individual contrast images were taken together and
used in combinationwith SPM’s flexible factorial design to test for effects
of RPE and target versus competitors. In addition, a regression analysis
with themean difference in satisfaction ratings between targets and com-
petitors as independent variable was used to test for a brain–behavior
relationship of the attraction effect across participants. Given the well
established evidence for RPE signals in the NAcc (Bartra et al., 2013;
Garrison et al., 2013; Clithero andRangel, 2014), we focused our analyses
on the NAcc using small-volume correction (SVC) for multiple-
comparisons and/or ROI analyses. Here, we report SVC/ROI results
based on an anatomical NAcc ROI taken from the IBASPM atlas
(Alema´n-Go´mez et al., 2006) as implemented in the WFU PickAtlas
toolbox (WFU PickAtlas, RRID:SCR_007378). Note, however, that re-
sults pertaining to the attraction effect (i.e., comparisons between targets
and competitors) do not change qualitatively if we used individually
defined functional ROIs that are based on the RPE signal (i.e., 4 mm
spheres around the individual peak voxels) instead. A statistical thresh-
old of p 0.05 was used for SVC and ROI analyses. For other regions, we
chose a threshold of p  0.05 (FWE corrected for whole brain), but no
region survived this threshold for any analysis reported here. Activations
are depicted on an overlay of the mean structural T1 image from all
participants, with a threshold of p 0.005 (uncorrected) with 10 contig-
uous voxels chosen for display purposes.
Results
The attraction effect biases intertemporal choices
To investigate whether intertemporal choices were affected by an
attraction effect, we tested 21 participants in Study 1 who first
completed a classical two-alternative version of the intertemporal
choice task. This allowed us to adjust the subsequent three-
alternative version to their individual level of temporal discount-
ing (Fig. 1A). In the three-alternative choice task, participants
were always offered an LLR and an SSR, plus a third option that
was either a decoy option similar to (but worse than) LLR (DLLR),
a decoy option similar to (but worse than) SSR (DSSR), or a neu-
tral option (N; Fig. 1C). The attraction effect predicts that the
probability of choosing LLR is higher when DLLR is in the choice
set than whenDSSR is in the choice set (and vice versa for SSR). In
other words: LLR becomes the target and SSR the competitor in
the presence of DLLR; SSR becomes the target and LLR the com-
petitor in the presence of DSSR; and targets are expected to be
chosen more often than competitors.
As predicted, we found that participant chose targets signifi-
cantly more often than competitors (targets: 55 7%; competi-
tors: 42 8%; t(20) 4.15; p 0.001; d 0.90; Fig. 2A, left). We
further observed that, in this task, participants chose LLR options
more often than SSR options (LLR: 57  17%; SSR: 20  12%;
t(20) 6.10; p 0.001; d 1.33). This is surprising given that we
ensured that LLRs’ and SSRs’ subjective values (based on fitting a
hyperbolic discountingmodel to the two-alternative choice data)
did not differ significantly from each other. Note that indiffer-
ence between LLR and SSR is not a necessary condition for the
attraction effect. Consistent with the attraction effect, although
participants preferred LLR over SSR in the presence of both DLLR
(t(20)  9.38; p  0.001; d  2.05) and DSSR (t(20)  3.46; p 
0.002; d 0.75), this preference was weaker for DSSR trials (Fig.
2A, right).
The attraction effect modulates the subjective valuation of
rewards in the absence of choice
In the fMRI experiment (Study 2), 29 participants first conducted
the same two-alternative choice task as in Study 1 for calibration
purposes. During MR scanning, however, they worked on a
three-alternative intertemporal lottery task (Fig. 1B) to investi-
gate whether the attraction effect modulates the RPE-related
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fMRI BOLD signal in the NAcc (see below). In each lottery trial,
participants saw the three options, but could not choose. Instead,
one of the three options was selected by the computer as the
reward for that particular trial. After scanning, half of the lottery
trials were repeated and participants gave satisfaction ratings for
the received lottery outcome in each trial. Similar to the choice
task in Study 1, we expected a modulation of the subjective valu-
ation of rewards by the attraction effect, but now in the absence of
choice. Indeed, satisfaction ratings were significantly higher for
targets than for competitors (t(28) 3.20; p 0.003; d 0.60; Fig.
2B, left). In contrast to Study 1, we did not find that participants
rated LLR outcomes significantly higher than SSR outcomes
(t(28) 1.50; p 0.144; d 0.28). However, it is notable that the
attraction effect was mainly driven by DLLR trials (t(28)  2.17;
p 0.038; d 0.40), whereas the rating difference between tar-
gets and competitors in DSSR trials did not differ (t(28)	0.75;
p  0.460; d  	0.14; Fig. 2B, right). In
addition, we ran a multiple linear regres-
sion analysis to test whether the attraction
effect explained variance over and above
the value of the lottery outcome and the
RPE as derived from hyperbolic discount-
ing. The rationale of this analysis is as fol-
lows. We expected that the hyperbolic
discounting-based outcome value and
RPE regressors can explain some variance
in satisfaction ratings because they cap-
ture general interindividual differences in
temporal discounting and because they
should make accurate predictions in trials
with a neutral third optionN. Conversely,
given that hyperbolic discounting does
not account for the attraction effect (see
the cognitive modeling results below), we
expected that the target versus competitor
and the decoy predictor variables explain
additional variance in the satisfaction rat-
ings. The results of this analysis are pro-
vided in Table 1. Indeed, the regression
coefficients of RPE, but also of target ver-
sus competitor outcomes, were signifi-
cantly positive, whereas the coefficient of
decoy outcomes was significantly nega-
tive. Consistent with the results reported
above, the coefficient for LLR versus SSR
was not significant.
In sum, our behavioral results suggest
the presence of a robust attraction effect in
both intertemporal choices and in valua-
tion of rewards froman intertemporal lot-
tery. However, the typical attraction effect
pattern (i.e., that targets are preferred
over competitors) was only present in
DLLR trials.
RPE signals in NAcc
With respect to the fMRI analyses, we first sought to establish that
our paradigm elicited a “conventional” RPE signal in the NAcc.
As for the behavioral analysis, the RPE used in this analysis was
based on the hyperbolic discounting model fitted to the choices
that each participant made in the two-alternative choice task be-
fore scanning. Based on the results of the behavioral regression
analysis (see above and Table 1), we expected a significant
relationship between the hyperbolic discounting-based RPE
regressor and the signal in NAcc even though this model is
incompatible with the attraction effect and should therefore not
capture the NAcc signal entirely. As shown in Figure 3A, we
found a significant RPE signal in both left and right NAcc (left:
peak MNI coordinates: X  	14/Y  4/Z  	10; z  4.92;
p(SVC)  0.001; right: 10/10/	14; z  3.31; p(SVC)  0.016).
Note that, similar to previous work (Park et al., 2012), we con-
trolled for the subjective value of the reward itself by including
this variable in the same analysis.
RPEmodulation by the attraction effect
Next,we tested forneural evidenceofRPEmodulationby the attrac-
tion effect by contrasting the fMRI signal for target versus competi-
tor outcomes.Given the strong empirical support for RPE coding in
NAcc, we used an ROI approach testing for the contrast target 
Figure 2. Behavioral results. A, Relative choice proportion of targets, competitors, and decoys for all trials (left) and separated
for trials in which LLR or SSR was the target (right) in Study 1. B, Same results for satisfaction ratings in Study 2. Note that, even
though the attraction effect is significant over both trial types (in both studies), the expected pattern (i.e., targets are preferred to
competitors) is only seen in trials with LLR being the target. Error bars in all figures represent SEM.
Table 1. Regression analysis of satisfaction ratings
Independent variable Coefficient: mean (SD) t-statistic p-value
Intercept 3.96 (2.65) 8.04 0.001
Voutcome 0.57 (2.29) 1.33 0.193
RPE 0.79 (1.58) 2.68 0.012
Target vs Competitor 0.19 (0.32) 3.29 0.003
Decoy 	1.07 (1.58) 	3.63 0.001
LLR vs SSR 0.28 (1.29) 1.16 0.254
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competitor averaged over an anatomically defined NAcc ROI. The
contrast was positive but not significant over all trials (t(28) 0.44;
p0.666;d0.08; Fig. 3B, left). This is not surprising given thatwe
saw the typical attraction effect pattern in the behavior only in DLLR
trials (see above). Therefore, we set up two separate target com-
petitor contrasts for lotteries containing either a DLLR or a DSSR de-
coy option. For DLLR trials, we found that the target competitor
contrastwas significantly positive (t(28) 2.10; p 0.045;d 0.39),
whereas for DSSR options, the contrast was not significant (t(28) 
	1.44; p 0.160; d	0.27; Fig. 3B, right). Expectedly, the differ-
ence between trial types was also significant (t(28) 2.63; p 0.014;
d  0.49). Importantly, to rule out that these effects are merely
driven by a difference in NAcc activation between LLR and SSR
outcomes, we tested for such a difference, but did not find any evi-
dence for it (neither with a very liberal statistical threshold nor with
an ROI approach), which is consistent with the nonsignificant be-
havioral difference between LLR and SSR outcomes in Study 2 (see
above). In summary, for those trials forwhich our behavioral results
suggesteda strongattractioneffect,wealso foundanattractioneffect
modulation of the RPE signal in the NAcc.
RPEmodulation across participants
Interdependencies between choice or lottery options (such as
attraction effects) may affect valuation processes differently in
different participants. We predicted that participants whose sat-
isfaction ratings were more strongly modulated by the attraction
effect should also exhibit a stronger modulation of the RPE re-
sponse in NAcc. To test this, we conducted a regression analysis
across participants with the (behavioral) rating difference of tar-
gets	 competitors as independent variable and the (brain) fMRI
contrast of target competitor as dependent variable. This anal-
ysis revealed a significant brain–behavior correlation in the right
NAcc (14/12/-14; z  3.44; p(SVC)  0.013; Fig. 4). In other
words, participants with a stronger NAcc signal for target com-
pared with competitor outcomes during MR scanning reported
higher satisfaction for receiving target outcomes compared with
competitor outcomes afterward.
Cognitive modeling of intertemporal choices
The attraction effect can be accounted for by multi-attribute se-
quential sampling models such as the LCA model (Usher and
McClelland, 2001, 2004), but should pose a challenge to tradi-
tional discounting models because they adhere to the IIA princi-
ple. In addition, the recently proposed ITCH model (Ericson et
al., 2015), which is based on the comparison of absolute and
relative differences of magnitudes and delays, has been shown to
better account for specific patterns in intertemporal choices than
traditional discounting models. Because this model does not im-
ply IIA, it remains open whether it also explains the attraction
effect. Therefore, we compared hyperbolic and exponential dis-
counting models, the LCA model (adapted to intertemporal
choices), and the ITCH model with respect to their ability of
predicting participants’ decisions in Study 1. We used a general-
ization test (Busemeyer and Wang, 2000) to examine how well
the models’ predictions could be generalized from the two-
alternative to the three-alternative intertemporal choice task and
from trials comprising a neutral option N to trials comprising a
decoy option (within the three-alternative task).
First, we tested the generalization results on a qualitative level
by looking at the choice predictions for targets, competitors, and
decoys. As can be seen from Figure 5A, only LCA predicted (cor-
rectly) that targets were chosenmore often than competitors. Next,
we compared the models on a quantitative level. When fitting the
models to the data from the two-alternative choice task, we found
that allmodelswere better than a baselinemodel that predicted each
choice with p 1/2 and that the models performed almost equally
well (Fig. 5B, left). On the individual level, hyperbolic discounting
and the LCAmodel best explained the data for the majority of par-
ticipants but, in general, the two-alternative choice dataset was
insufficient to identify a winning model unambiguously. On the
contrary, the generalization test to the three-alternative inter-
temporal choice task yielded more conclusive results (Fig. 5B,
right). LCA had the lowest average deviance of all models and
provided the best generalization results for 12 of 21 partici-
pants (with very strong evidence for LCA in six participants).
In light of participants’ tendency to prefer LLR options in the
three-alternative task (see above), we conducted a second gener-
alization test. Here, we used the trials from the three-alternative
choice task that involved the neutral optionN to estimate param-
eters and then tested the models’ generalizability with respect to
the remaining trials (that involved a decoy option). For the data-
set for which parameters were estimated, all models predicted
choices better than chance (Fig. 5C, left). LCAwas the bestmodel
overall and for more participants than any other model, but the
Figure 3. RPE brain signal and the attraction effect. A, “Conventional” RPE regressor based on hyperbolic discounting correlated with the fMRI signal in bilateral NAcc. The red outline illustrates
the NAcc ROI used for statistical testing and data extraction. B, Mean activations in the NAcc ROI for the contrast target outcomes competitor outcomes over all trials (left) and for trials with
LLR/SSR being the target separately (right). The attraction effect pattern (target competitor) was found in trials with LLR being the target. The negative tendency for trials with SSR being the
target was not significant. *p 0.05.
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hyperbolic discounting model and the ITCH model performed
similarly. Yet again, the generalization results unequivocally
identified LCAas the bestmodel (Fig. 5C, right): LCAhad amuch
smaller deviance than any other model and provided the best fit
for 13 of 21 participants (with very strong evidence for LCA in 11
participants).
Discussion
In the present study, we tested for behavioral and neural evidence
of a modulation of the RPE by the attraction effect. To begin, we
demonstrated for the first time an attraction effect in the context
of intertemporal choices (Study 1). Also for the first time, we
observed an RPE modulation on the behavioral level (i.e., out-
come satisfaction) in Study 2 when participants did not choose
between options but received and evaluated potential rewards.
On the neural side, we found the expectedRPEmodulation by the
attraction effect in theNAcc in trials in which the LLR optionwas
the target. This was consistent with our behavioral results, which
also showed the typical attraction effect pattern (i.e., target 
competitor) for only these trials. Moreover, the target/com-
petitor differences in the NAcc signal and in the ratings were
correlated across participants. Finally, we demonstrated that a
cognitive process model, which relies on the dynamic compar-
isons of attribute values, outperforms not only traditional hy-
perbolic and exponential discounting models, but also a more
recently proposed attribute-based heuristic (i.e., the ITCH
model) in predicting our data.
In a recent electrophysiology study with nonhuman primates
(Lak et al., 2014), the dopaminergic RPE signal in response to
different reward-predicting cues could be anticipated by assess-
ing the subjective value of the rewards in an independent choice
task. This observation led the authors to speculate that “the value
of the cuewas independent of the value of the other options,” that
“economic values were . . . stable across time and behavioral con-
text,” and that “the value represented by dopamine neurons in a
nonchoice context is consistent with the values used for choice.”
Although these conclusions may be warranted in specific exper-
imental contexts, our findings challenge the putative general con-
text independence of the RPE on the basis of its susceptibility to
the attraction effect. In particular, we argue that because the (mo-
mentary) utility of an option depends on the alternatives in the
set (Rieskamp et al., 2006; Vlaev et al., 2011), the RPE signal, after
receiving a particular option, should also reflect this dependence.
Similar to previous studies (Yacubian et
al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Park et al.,
2012), we examined the characteristics of
RPE coding in a lottery task that did not
include a learning component. Given that
our results can be generalized to settings
in which outcomes are not fully described
but have to be experienced through trial
and error (Daw et al., 2006; Gluth et al.,
2014), they will have important implica-
tions for theories of reinforcement learn-
ing (RL). For instance, the softmax rule,
arguably the most commonly applied
choice rule in RL models, implies the IIA
principle (Hunt et al., 2014) and is thus
incompatible with context effects such as
the attraction effect. Our findings there-
fore suggest that the softmax choice rule
might not be suitable for decisions with
more than two alternatives that are char-
acterized by two or more attributes (e.g., reward magnitude and
probability). Moreover, if context effects are not taken into ac-
count when computing (subjective) reward expectations, the size
and even the sign of the RPE might be predicted incorrectly.
The fMRI signal in the NAcc at the time of reward was only
consistent with an attraction effect modulation for trials with
DLLR decoys. This, however, matched our behavioral findings in
both Study 1 and 2 to the extent that only in DLLR trials were
targets preferred over competitors and given higher ratings. In
fact, the only difference between the behavioral and neural results
was that in the former, but not in the latter, the preference for
targets in DLLR trials was so much higher than the preference for
competitors in DSSR trials that the attraction effect became signif-
icant when collapsing the data over all trials. The linkage of the
attraction effectmodulation between brain and behaviorwas fur-
ther supported by the interindividual correlation of target versus
competitor differences in NAcc activation and satisfaction rat-
ings. Importantly, we ruled out an alternative explanation of the
significant effect in DLLR trials, namely that LLR rewards gener-
ally elicited a more positive RPE signal than SSR rewards (also
consistent with the LLR–SSR difference in satisfaction ratings
being not significant). Notably, asymmetries in the attraction
effect as we observed it in our data are common in studies of
multi-alternative decision making. For instance, in their meta-
analyses on the attraction effect in consumer choice, Heath and
Chatterjee (1995) conclude that the introduction of decoys leads
to a stronger attracting effect on higher-quality, higher-price
than on lower-quality, lower-price options. Therefore, different
attributes such as money, delay, price, or product quality appear
to be differently resistant to context-dependent modulations, al-
though the reasons for these asymmetries remain unclear.
Hyperbolic discounting has replaced exponential discounting
as the standardway of describing intertemporal choice because of
its ability to account for time inconsistencies that were confirmed
empirically (Kirby andHerrnstein, 1995; Laibson, 1997; Peters et
al., 2012).However,more recent work has revealed novel system-
atic patterns in intertemporal choice that are incompatible with
both hyperbolic and exponential discounting (Scholten and
Read, 2010; Dai and Busemeyer, 2014; Ericson et al., 2015; Lem-
pert andPhelps, 2016). In particular, themagnitude and the delay
duration effect show that discount factors change when reward
amounts and delays of LLR and SSR options aremultiplied by the
same constant. Accordingly, new choice models such as the
Figure 4. Brain–behavior correlation of the attraction effect. A, Regression of the fMRI contrast target competitor on the
target	 competitor difference in satisfaction ratings revealed a significant effect in the right NAcc.B, Scatterplot of the effect for
illustration purposes. The individual peak estimates of the fMRI contrast shown here were derived using a leave-one-subject-out
approach (Esterman et al., 2010) to avoid the nonindependence error. According to this approach, the strength of the brain–
behavior correlation is r(27) 0.50.
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trade-off model (Scholten and Read, 2010) or the ITCH model
(Ericson et al., 2015) have been proposed. The critical feature of
those models is the direct comparison of attribute values (i.e.,
amount and delay) between LLR and SSR options. Intriguingly,
this development in intertemporal choice theories matches the
more general critique of “value-first” models, which assume that
the choice process is preceded by independently assessing each
option’s subjective value (Rieskamp et al., 2006; Vlaev et al., 2011;
Hunt et al., 2014). Hyperbolic and exponential discounting be-
long to the family of “value-first” models and so do expected
utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and simple neuroeco-
nomic choice models (Glimcher, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011).
The general picture that emerges here is that these models fail to
account for interactions between choice options caused by com-
parisons within single attributes. Our findings suggest that we
must recognize intertemporal choice as a form of multi-attribute
decision making in which money and delay trade off.
Even if a cognitive model is based on direct comparisons of
attribute values, it is not guaranteed that it will account for
particular context effects. The ITCH model was specifically
designed to explain context effects reported in studies of in-
tertemporal choice (i.e., the magnitude and the delay duration
effect) and allows for violations of the IIA principle. In our
study, however, we showed that this model has difficulties
with predicting the attraction effect (though other ways to
generalize the model to choices with more than two alterna-
tives are conceivable and might be better suited to predict the
effect). This is because the model does not have a mechanism
to exploit asymmetries in dominance relationships. In con-
trast, LCA uses loss aversion to produce the attraction effect
and accounts for several other multi-alternative context ef-
fects, including the similarity and the compromise effects
(Usher and McClelland, 2004; Tsetsos et al., 2010). Moreover,
because LCA assumes direct comparisons of attribute values,
it can (in principle) account for the magnitude and the delay
duration effects (see also Dai and Busemeyer, 2014). It should
be noted, however, that LCA is only one of many sequential
sampling models that account for context effects by using
various different assumptions (cf. Rieskamp et al., 2006). In
fact, LCA has been criticized for requiring loss aversion to
explain the attraction effect, which is difficult to reconcile with
evidence for this effect in perceptual decisions (Trueblood et
al., 2014). Given that loss aversion appears sensible in the
context of intertemporal choice, the current study does not
add to this ongoing debate. It rather points to sequential sam-
pling models as a general and strong framework that enables
context-dependent predictions of choice behavior.
Figure 5. Model comparisons. A, Comparison of choice frequencies and model predictions for targets, competitors, and decoys. B, Results of the first generalization test (i.e., generalizing from
two-alternative to all three-alternative choice trials). Left and right panels show results for the training and test datasets, respectively. Within each panel, average BICs/deviances per model are
shownon the left andevidence for thebestmodel for eachparticipant are shownon the right. LowerBICs/deviances indicatebetter fits. Dashed line indicates the fit of abaselinemodel that “guesses”
each choice with equal probability. C, Results for the second generalization test (i.e., generalizing from trials with an N option to trials with a decoy option). HD, Hyperbolic discounting model; ED,
exponential discounting model.
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To the best of our knowledge, our results also demonstrate for
the first time that context effects such as the attraction effect can
be elicited in the absence of choice, that is, when people evaluate
the (relative) desirability of different potential rewards. The un-
derlying mechanisms of this context-dependent reward valua-
tion remain unclear, but we speculate that within-attribute
comparisons similar to those during multi-alternative choice are
at play. In other words, when evaluating the desirability of differ-
ent potential rewards, people weigh the rewards’ advantages and
disadvantages with respect to specific attributes and determine
on this basis which of the different rewards are most/least desir-
able (in the current context). Certainly, more research is needed
to substantiate this proposition and to identify common versus
distinct mechanisms of context-dependent choice and valuation.
In conclusion, we have shown that both RPE coding and in-
tertemporal choice are prone to the attraction effect and violate
the IIA and regularity principles of the axiomatic approach in
behavioral economics. Accordingly, potential multi-alternative
context effects in choice and valuation processes must be consid-
ered as we develop theories of reinforcement learning and delay
discounting.
References
Alema´n-Go´mez Y, Melie-García L, Valde´s-Hernandez P (2006) IBASPM:
Toolbox for automatic parcellation of brain structures. Poster presented
at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Organization for Human Brain Map-
ping, Florence, Italy, June.
Ashburner J (2007) A fast diffeomorphic image registration algorithm.
Neuroimage 38:95–113. CrossRef Medline
BartraO,McGuire JT, Kable JW (2013) The valuation system: a coordinate-
basedmeta-analysis of BOLD fMRI experiments examining neural corre-
lates of subjective value. Neuroimage 76:412–427. CrossRef Medline
Berkowitsch NA, Scheibehenne B, Rieskamp J (2014) Rigorously testing
multialternative decision field theory against randomutilitymodels. J Exp
Psychol Gen 143:1331–1348. CrossRef Medline
Bhatia S (2013) Associations and the accumulation of preference. Psychol
Rev 120:522–543. CrossRef Medline
Bogacz R, Brown E, Moehlis J, Holmes P, Cohen JD (2006) The physics of
optimal decision making: a formal analysis of models of performance in
two-alternative forced-choice tasks. Psychol Rev 113:700–765. CrossRef
Medline
Bu¨chel C, Holmes AP, Rees G, Friston KJ (1998) Characterizing stimulus-
response functions using nonlinear regressors in parametric fMRI exper-
iments. Neuroimage 8:140–148. CrossRef Medline
Busemeyer JR, Wang YM (2000) Model comparisons and model selections
based on generalization criterion methodology. J Math Psychol 44:171–
189. CrossRef Medline
Clithero JA, Rangel A (2014) Informatic parcellation of the network in-
volved in the computation of subjective value. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci
9:1289–1302. CrossRef Medline
Dai J, Busemeyer JR (2014) A probabilistic, dynamic, and attribute-wise
model of intertemporal choice. J Exp Psychol Gen 143:1489–1514.
CrossRef Medline
Daw ND, O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Seymour B, Dolan RJ (2006) Cortical
substrates for exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441:876–879.
CrossRef Medline
Deichmann R, Gottfried JA, Hutton C, Turner R (2003) Optimized EPI for
fMRI studies of the orbitofrontal cortex. Neuroimage 19:430–441.
CrossRef Medline
Ericson KM,White JM, LaibsonD, Cohen JD (2015) Money earlier or later?
Simple heuristics explain intertemporal choices better than delay dis-
counting does. Psychol Sci 26:826–833. CrossRef Medline
EstermanM, Tamber-Rosenau BJ, Chiu YC, Yantis S (2010) Avoiding non-
independence in fMRI data analysis: leave one subject out. Neuroimage
50:572–576. CrossRef Medline
Frederick S, Loewenstein G, O’Donoghue T (2002) Time discounting and
time preference: a critical review. J Econ Lit 40:351–401. CrossRef
Garrison J, Erdeniz B, Done J (2013) Prediction error in reinforcement
learning: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neurosci Biobehav
Rev 37:1297–1310. CrossRef Medline
Glimcher PW (2009) Choice: toward a standard back-pocket model. In:
Neuroeconomics: decision making and the brain, Ed 1 (Glimcher PW,
Camerer CF, Fehr E, Poldrack RA, eds), pp 503–522. Amsterdam:
Elsevier/Academic.
Gluth S, Rieskamp J, Bu¨chel C (2013) Deciding not to decide: computa-
tional and neural evidence for hidden behavior in sequential choice. PLoS
Comput Biol 9:e1003309. CrossRef Medline
Gluth S, Rieskamp J, Bu¨chel C (2014) Neural evidence for adaptive strategy
selection in value-based decision-making. Cereb Cortex 24:2009–2021.
CrossRef Medline
Gluth S, Sommer T, Rieskamp J, Bu¨chel C (2015) Effective connectivity
between hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex controls pref-
erential choices frommemory. Neuron 86:1078–1090. CrossRef Medline
Gold JI, ShadlenMN (2007) The neural basis of decisionmaking. Annu Rev
Neurosci 30:535–574. CrossRef Medline
Hare TA, O’Doherty J, Camerer CF, Schultz W, Rangel A (2008) Dissociat-
ing the role of the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computa-
tion of goal values and prediction errors. J Neurosci 28:5623–5630.
CrossRef Medline
Heath TB, Chatterjee S (1995) Asymmetric decoy effects on lower-quality
versus higher-quality brands: meta-analytic and experimental evidence.
J Consum Res 22:268–284. CrossRef
Heekeren HR, Marrett S, Ungerleider LG (2008) The neural systems that
mediate human perceptual decision making. Nat Rev Neurosci 9:467–
479. CrossRef Medline
Huber J, Payne JW, Puto C (1982) Adding asymmetrically dominated alter-
natives: violations of regularity and the similarity hypothesis. J Consum
Res 9:90–98. CrossRef
Hunt LT, Dolan RJ, Behrens TE (2014) Hierarchical competitions sub-
serving multi-attribute choice. Nat Neurosci 17:1613–1622. CrossRef
Medline
Hutton C, Bork A, Josephs O, Deichmann R, Ashburner J, Turner R (2002)
Image distortion correction in fMRI: a quantitative evaluation. Neuroim-
age 16:217–240. CrossRef Medline
Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47:263–292. CrossRef
Kirby KN, Herrnstein RJ (1995) Preference reversals due to myopic dis-
counting of delayed reward. Psychol Sci 6:83–89. CrossRef
Laibson D (1997) Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Q J Econ 112:
443–478. CrossRef
LakA, StaufferWR, SchultzW (2014) Dopamine prediction error responses
integrate subjective value from different reward dimensions. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 111:2343–2348. CrossRef Medline
Lempert KM, Phelps EA (2016) The malleability of intertemporal choice.
Trends Cogn Sci 20:64–74. CrossRef Medline
Louie K, KhawMW,Glimcher PW (2013) Normalization is a general neural
mechanism for context-dependent decision making. Proc Natl Acad Sci
U S A 110:6139–6144. CrossRef Medline
Luce RD (1959) Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. Mineola,
NY: Dover Publications.
Mazur JE (1987) An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforce-
ment. In: Quantitative analyses of behavior, Vol. 5: the effect of delay and
of intervening events on reinforcement value, pp 55–73. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
McClure SM, LaibsonDI, Loewenstein G, Cohen JD (2004) Separate neural
systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science 306:
503–507. CrossRef Medline
Mumford JA, Poline JB, Poldrack RA (2015) Orthogonalization of regres-
sors in FMRI models. PLoS One 10:e0126255. CrossRef Medline
Nelder JA, Mead R (1965) A simplex method for function minimization.
Comput J 7:308–313. CrossRef
Padoa-Schioppa C (2011) Neurobiology of economic choice: a good-based
model. Annu Rev Neurosci 34:333–359. CrossRef Medline
Park SQ, Kahnt T, Talmi D, Rieskamp J, Dolan RJ, Heekeren HR (2012)
Adaptive coding of reward prediction errors is gated by striatal coupling.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 109:4285–4289. CrossRef Medline
Peters J, Miedl SF, Bu¨chel C (2012) Formal comparison of dual-parameter
temporal discounting models in controls and pathological gamblers.
PLoS One 7:e47225. CrossRef Medline
Gluth et al. • Attraction Effect Modulates Prediction Errors J. Neurosci., January 11, 2017 • 37(2):371–382 • 381
Raftery AE (1995) Bayesianmodel selection in social research. Sociol Meth-
odol 25:111. CrossRef
Rieskamp J (2008) The probabilistic nature of preferential choice. J Exp
Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 34:1446–1465. CrossRef Medline
Rieskamp J,Busemeyer JR,MellersBA (2006) Extending theboundsof rationality:
Evidence and theories of preferential choice. J EconLit 44:631–661.CrossRef
Roe RM, Busemeyer JR, Townsend JT (2001) Multialternative decision field
theory: a dynamic connectionist model of decision making. Psychol Rev
108:370–392. CrossRef Medline
Samuelson P (1937) A note on measurement of utility. Rev Econ Stud
4:155–161. CrossRef
ScholtenM, Read D (2010) The psychology of intertemporal tradeoffs. Psy-
chol Rev 117:925–944. CrossRef Medline
Schultz W, Dayan P, Montague PR (1997) A neural substrate of prediction
and reward. Science 275:1593–1599. CrossRef Medline
Schwarz G (1978) Estimating the dimension of a model. Ann Stat 6:461–
464. CrossRef
Shafir S, Waite T, Smith B (2002) Context-dependent violations of rational
choice in honeybees (Apis mellifera) and gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis).
Behav Ecol Sociobiol 51:180–187. CrossRef
Smith PL, Ratcliff R (2004) Psychology and neurobiology of simple deci-
sions. Trends Neurosci 27:161–168. CrossRef Medline
Sutton RS, Barto AG (1998) Reinforcement learning: an introduction.
Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Tobler PN,O’Doherty JP,DolanRJ, SchultzW (2006) Humanneural learn-
ing depends on reward prediction errors in the blocking paradigm. J Neu-
rophysiol 95:301–310. CrossRef Medline
Trueblood JS, Brown SD, Heathcote A, Busemeyer JR (2013) Not just for
consumers: context effects are fundamental to decision making. Psychol
Sci 24:901–908. CrossRef Medline
Trueblood JS, Brown SD,Heathcote A (2014) Themultiattribute linear bal-
listic accumulator model of context effects in multialternative choice.
Psychol Rev 121:179–205. CrossRef Medline
Tsetsos K, Usher M, Chater N (2010) Preference reversal in multiattribute
choice. Psychol Rev 117:1275–1293. CrossRef Medline
Tversky A (1972) Elimination by aspects: a theory of choice. Psychol Rev
79:281–299. CrossRef
Tversky A, KahnemanD (1991) Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-
dependent model. Q J Econ 106:1039–1061. CrossRef
Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: cumulative
representation of uncertainty. J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323. CrossRef
Usher M, McClelland JL (2001) The time course of perceptual choice: the leaky,
competing accumulatormodel. Psychol Rev 108:550–592.CrossRefMedline
Usher M, McClelland JL (2004) Loss aversion and inhibition in dynamical
models of multialternative choice. Psychol Rev 111:757–769. CrossRef
Medline
Vlaev I, Chater N, Stewart N, Brown GD (2011) Does the brain calculate
value? Trends Cogn Sci 15:546–554. CrossRef Medline
Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1947) Theory of games and economic
behavior, Ed 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
Wittmann M, Paulus MP (2008) Decision making, impulsivity and time
perception. Trends Cogn Sci 12:7–12. CrossRef Medline
Wollschla¨ger LM, Diederich A (2012) The 2N-ary choice tree model for
N-alternative preferential choice. Front Psychol 3:189. Medline
Yacubian J, Gla¨scher J, Schroeder K, Sommer T, Braus DF, Bu¨chel C (2006)
Dissociable systems for gain- and loss-related value predictions and errors
of prediction in the human brain. J Neurosci 26:9530–9537. CrossRef
Medline
Zauberman G, Kim BK, Malkoc SA, Bettman JR (2009) Discounting time
and time discounting: Subjective time perception and intertemporal pref-
erences. J Mark Res 46:543–556. CrossRef
382 • J. Neurosci., January 11, 2017 • 37(2):371–382 Gluth et al. • Attraction Effect Modulates Prediction Errors
